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Abstract
By initiating the development of a gigantic international trade network across 
Asia, Europe and Africa, with several trade corridors that will span around 60 
countries, China intends to stimulate substantial economic growth. Already in 
the ﬁrst phase, focused on building an adequate infrastructure, multinational 
enterprises will play a vital role in developing the so-called New Silk Road 
or the 'One Belt, One Road' initiative. This article inquires into the environ-
mental impacts that a venture of this magnitude will entail and discusses the 
potential of the available voluntary and mandatory governance instruments 
to lead the key economic actors to take sustainability criteria into account.
Keywords: One Belt, One Road; multinational enterprises; environmental impacts; 
sustainability innovations; governance instruments
Introduction
The New Silk Road or the 'One Belt, One Road' (OBOR) initiative aims 
at nothing less than creating a comprehensive trading network across 
three continents - Asia, Europe and Africa - thereby integrating around 
60 countries with a total of about 63 per cent of the global population, 
presently generating 29 per cent of worldwide GDP (Wang 2014). The 
concept of the '21st Century Maritime Silk Road' as a means to intensify 
China's maritime cooperation with Asian countries and to develop new 
trade routes via Africa to Europe was introduced in October 2013 by the 
Chinese president in a speech at the Indonesian parliament. The mari-
time road is planned to include two main routes: 1) From China through 
the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean and from there to Europe and, 
2) from China via the South China Sea to the South Paciﬁc (Eyler 2015a;1 
Leung 2015;2 Maritime Insight 2015).3 During another speech, just one 
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month earlier at the Nazarbayev University in Khazakstan, Xi Jinping 
had already revealed his vision to build a 'Silk Road Economic Belt' be-
tween Europe and China – a land route that would not only connect two 
of the world's most vibrant economic hubs but also generate economic 
impetus and create new markets in the regions between them.
Although sea transport will probably remain the dominant form of 
freight transport in the foreseeable future, the concept of a land bridge 
connecting so many markets by approximately 12,000 km of track offers 
a wide range of new economic incentives. Furthermore, transporting the 
goods by rail provides a much faster connection between Europe and 
China. While a container ship needs 30 to 40 days, goods delivered by train 
would reach their destination in only 14 to 18 days (Arduino 2014).
The railway network will bring together Asian, European and African 
countries via three main routes, each with China as the starting point: (1) 
to Central Asia, Russia and Europe (the Baltic), (2) to the Persian Gulf and 
the Mediterranean Sea through Central and West Asia and (3) to South-
east Asia, South Asia and the Indian Ocean. The main lines that have 
already been launched connect Chongqing and Duisburg (Germany) 
since 2011; Wuhan to Pardubice (Czech Republic) since 2012; Chengdu to 
Lodz (Poland) since 2013; Zhengzhou to Hamburg (Germany) since 2013; 
Yiwu to Madrid (Spain) since 2014; and Wuhan to Hamburg (Germany) 
since 2015 (Arduino 2014; Leung 2015; Suárez 2014).4
Similar to the maritime network, which builds on an already existing 
network, the idea of a Eurasian railway network is not entirely new. 
As stated above, some of the main lines have already been in use for 
some time. The connection between Yiwu and Madrid, for instance, 
uses, among others, parts of the Trans-Siberian Railroad as well as es-
tablished railway links passing through Germany and France (Suárez 
2014). However, up until now trains primarily carried freight from China 
to Europe and not vice versa. 
Nevertheless, the OBOR initiative has gained considerable momentum 
since the vision was ﬁrst outlined by Xi Jinping, (NDRC et al. 2015; Wang 
2014). Not only do most of the Chinese provinces and municipalities 
explicitly plan to incorporate the project into their economic planning 
(Wangyi 2015),5 but the initiative also met with an overwhelmingly posi-
tive response from the governments of nearly all countries posited to 
be integrated into the project. China has been able to enter into bilateral 
agreements with a vast number of individual states throughout Asia 
and Europe as well as with several trading blocs. The latter includes 
engagement in the EU investment offensive, launched in 2014 (EU-
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China 2015; Zhao 2015),6 a memorandum concerning OBOR with the 
sixteen central and Eastern Europe (CEE) countries (Xinhua 2015)7 and 
intensiﬁed cooperation with the ASEAN via the ASEAN Master Plan 
for Connectivity (AMPC) (Blanco Pitlo 2015).8 
The OBOR initiative is funded by a range of ﬁnancial institutions. 
These include the US$40 billion Silk Road Fund, founded in November 
2014; the US$100 billion Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), 
established in June 2015; the US$100 billion BRICS New Development 
Bank, founded in July 2014; and US$50-100 billion coming from the 
sovereign wealth fund China Investment Corp., which was incorporated 
in January 2015.
Economic plans of such magnitude cannot be seen in isolation from 
the vast array of environmental parameters deteriorating worldwide 
– a process fuelled by a global growth-driven model of development. 
Against this background, this article looks at the environmental impacts 
of the OBOR initiative and examines the question of how and to what 
extent the key economic actors in this initiative are incentivized to adopt 
a more sustainable behaviour by mandatory and voluntary governance 
instruments.
The Environmental Importance of the OBOR Initiative
The recently concluded UN Climate Change Conference in Paris set 
ambitious goals concerning the direction of development for the next 
decades. The Paris Agreement, negotiated during the Conference of 
the Parties of the UNFCCC and adopted by consensus9 but not fully 
ratiﬁed, aims at 'holding the increase in the global average temperature 
to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to 
limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels' 
(FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1: 2). At the same time, the agreement 
already acknowledges that the currently intended nationally deter-
mined contributions (INDCs) are not sufﬁcient to limit greenhouse gas 
emissions to a level ensuring the achievement of these aims (UNFCCC 
INDC 2015).10 De facto it is assumed that the emissions, based on the 
INDCs, will exceed the acceptable level by at least 15 gigatonnes in 
2030 (FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1: 3). In addition, by 2013 experts had 
already estimated that the time window for temperature stabilization 
targets below 1.7°C would be closed due to prohibitively high economic 
mitigation challenges and that delaying substantial reductions by an-
other ﬁfteen years would push the 2-degree target out of reach as well 
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(Luderer et al. 2013: 6f). As such, the signiﬁcance of the environmental 
impacts triggered by the OBOR project − an economic initiative designed 
to substantially boost economic growth on three continents – should 
not be underestimated. 
The ﬁrst wave of investments will go towards developing an infra-
structure extensive enough to support a trade network of the envisaged 
dimensions. According to estimates, the investments had already boost-
ed China's GDP by 0.25 per cent in 2015 (Wang 2015b).11 The construction 
and expansion of transportation and logistics facilities are mainly carried 
out by multinational enterprises12 dominating these sectors (Dai 2014).13 
Accordingly, the overall sustainability balance of the OBOR initiative 
will be critically dependent on how the companies concerned act with 
respect to sustainability issues and how efﬁcient incentives prove to be 
in positively affecting their environmental performance.
The infrastructure-related industry comprises a wide range of differ-
ent branches, which cannot be analysed within the limited space of this 
article. However, with regard to the aim of looking into the conditions 
for a sustainable development of the OBOR project, it seems useful to 
concentrate on two of the most involved sectors which also rank among 
those with the highest environmental impact: the transportation sector 
and the construction industry, with a focus on the cement segment.
Motorized transport is responsible for 23 per cent of global energy-
related CO2 emissions – with the freight segment alone accounting for 
10 per cent (WEC 2011). The cement industry has a share of 6 per cent 
in worldwide emissions (WBCSD 2012). Apart from this, both sectors 
contribute substantially to the deterioration of a considerable number of 
environmental indicators. The extraction of raw materials in cement pro-
duction, for example, results in soil degradation, as well as in the loss of 
biodiversity and cultivable or natural areas. The main damages caused by 
the transport industry range from massive water and air pollution to the 
impairment of sensitive natural areas. By adding to the overuse of natu-
ral resources or sinks both industries thus negatively affect parameters 
of global environmental change and add to the pressure on planetary 
boundaries (Rockström et al 2009) even beyond climate effects.
Theoretical and Methodological Framework 
Research on the sustainability-relevant behaviour of industry sectors 
quickly runs up against limitations when mainstream economic theories 
– especially neoclassical approaches – are applied. This is because they 
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focus primarily on equilibrium conditions. Since the 1980s academics 
have increasingly turned to alternative economic approaches more 
suited to describing and analysing transition processes and which al-
low for a stronger focus on the role of individual actors (Nelson and 
Winter 1982). Within this context, the willingness of companies to adopt 
innovations and thus change their environmental behaviour plays a 
central role. More recent studies on innovations, their diffusion and 
their relevance for environmentally compatible production processes 
have found it useful to base their analyses on two interlinked alternative 
approaches: 1) evolutionary economics, which treats periods of adap-
tion as the normal state along development pathways and; 2) diffusion 
theory, which aims to explain the development and inﬂuencing factors 
of decision-relevant attitudes and conditions concerning innovations 
(Rogers 2003). Sustainability innovation is here understood as: 
the development and implementation of a technical, organisational, 
institutional or social problem solution contributing to the preservation 
of critical natural assets and to economic activities and consumption level 
which are feasible on a long-term and global basis. (Clausen, Fichter and 
Winter 2011: 9)
Following the baseline study on diffusion paths by Clausen, Fichter 
and Winter (2011: 51), this article assumes that a development path is not 
only affected by endogenous parameters but by various external variables 
acting as pull and push factors. In this context it concentrates on two of the 
inﬂuence spheres, namely sector-speciﬁc and policy-related inﬂuences.
Intervention by external actors is divided into regulatory push and 
pull factors. Regulatory push comes from national and supranational 
regulations aiming at exnovation, i.e. the avoidance or reduction of 
environmentally destructive practices. They comprise all process steps 
from political discussion regarding measures of legal provisions and 
prohibitions, up to their effective enactment. Regulatory pull can be 
exerted through incentives for innovations and their diffusion by deﬁn-
ing environmental targets, providing subsidies and preferential ﬁscal 
treatment, as well as creating a favourable legal framework (Clausen, 
Fichter and Winter 2011: 86-87).
The OBOR project has ambitious economic goals and it will involve 
some of the most highly polluting industries. As such, it can be expected 
that channelling the development in a more sustainable direction will 
not be easy (Shu 2016)14 and will require clear incentives and strong sets 
of rules. This article will survey the role and potential of voluntary and 
mandatory governance arrangements in inducing companies to move 
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away from unsustainable pathways and adopt more environmentally 
sound innovations. 
The Role of Multinational Enterprises
The majority of future customers using the new infrastructure envi-
sioned by the OBOR initiative will be manufacturers of consumer goods 
and trading companies that need freight transport capacities and – to 
a certain degree – passenger transport facilities as well. The extension 
of the modal split with the aim to enhance the Eurasian trade network 
had received an overwhelmingly positive response by European and 
Asian enterprises alike - thus indicating a huge demand regarding both 
already existent markets as well as totally new segments like the rail 
shipment of perishables from the Netherlands to China (Ni 2015).15 Not 
least, Asian e-commerce is growing with amazing speed and it needs 
additional transport and warehouse facilities (Fung Business 2013; Ding 
2010;16 The State Council).17
A broad spectrum of different multinational transport providers 
throughout Asia and Europe are responding to this trend by expanding 
their service across the whole range of transportation modes. Whether 
new outlets, as well as short and middle distance transportation and 
logistical support, will attract small and middle-sized companies re-
mains to be seen, though it seems likely. However, in the context of 
long-distance transportation and complex logistical operations the 
dominance of Asian and European-based multinational enterprises 
is already evident. They build on comprehensive know-how and are 
already successfully engaged in various business segments including, 
for example, multi-modal transport.
Aside from the transportation sector, the planned trade network 
involves substantial investments in logistic infrastructure, including 
the construction or extension of dry ports, ports, airports, train sta-
tions, warehouses and road networks, etc. In particular, the emergence 
of new logistic and trade hubs, like the Chengdu-Chongqing area in 
China, comes with a huge construction demand (Chengdu Ribao;18 
Wang 2015a).19 In the context of excessive capacities following the 
overheated development in the Chinese real estate market, the OBOR 
initiative is at least partially designed as a 'going out' strategy (zou chu 
qu) for Chinese infrastructure-related companies to meet overcapacity 
problems(Eyler 2015b;20 He 2015;21 Zhao and Yang 2015). Thus, the ce-
ment industry, supplying one of the most crucial building materials, is 
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among the primary beneﬁciaries of China's OBOR project. China's over-
capacity in cement production is enormous. With a capacity utilization 
of 65 per cent, Chinese cement enterprises, suffering from a dwindling 
demand, are well below worldwide average. From an economic point 
of view, China's total production capacity could be curbed by at least 
one third, which would amount to one eighth of global production 
(Perilli 2015).
Overcapacities are, however, by no means the sole problem for the 
Chinese building materials sector. Revenue decline due to overcapacity 
troubles almost all infrastructure-related industries in China. This ap-
plies, for example, to the railway industry (China Daily 2015; Zhao and 
Yang 2015) and ocean carriers and sea freight forwarders (Wei 2015).22 
The Chinese aviation market has been one of the fastest growing mar-
kets worldwide but the rapid expansion has not been accompanied by 
appropriate economic success. Some 75 per cent of all Chinese airports 
run a deﬁcit, and high-speed rail has become an increasingly serious 
competitor for airlines, especially in relation to ﬂights within China 
(Solmecke 2014: 285ff).
For European multinationals the OBOR initiative also comes at a 
time when global demand is slowing (Wei 2015). The Chinese strategy 
concerning trade corridors through Europe coincided with European 
Union plans to stimulate the economy, lagging in the wake of the global 
economic and ﬁnancial crisis, and to deepen the single market with a 
new investment plan (European Commission 2015).23 Like the OBOR 
initiative, this investment plan puts a clear focus on the expansion of 
demand in order to revitalize economic growth (EU 2014). It is intended 
that these 'ﬂagship initiatives' (EU-China 2015) will be closely coupled 
in the future. In order to generate and maximize synergies and con-
nectivity, a working group comprising experts from the Chinese Silk 
Road Fund, the European Commission and the European Investment 
Bank (EIB) was set up in 2015. It seeks to create concrete opportunities 
for China to invest in the European investment plan, namely within the 
context of the OBOR initiative.
Beside economic goals, the OBOR programme and the EU investment 
strategy, as well as the funding institutions, emphasize environmental 
soundness and sustainable development as core objectives (AIIB 2015: 
Chap.1; Michael 2015).24 In the context of anthropogenic climate change 
the importance of low-carbon development is particularly stressed 
(AIIB 2016a; The State Council 2014b;25 The State Council 2015: 2, 5;26 
Xinhua 2014).27 Within this nexus of economic and environmental goals 
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European and Chinese multinationals are developing their strategies 
for their Eurasian business activities.
Multinationals and Incentives for Sustainable Development
The main actors in the OBOR project are well-established companies that 
are widening and strengthening their business ﬁelds. This makes it dif-
ﬁcult to create a favourable climate for profound sustainability-relevant 
changes that would require multinationals to give up well-tested and 
proﬁtable business practices. Studies on path dependencies (Clausen, 
Fichter and Winter 2011: 47ff; Lehmann-Waffenschmidt and Reichel 
2000) show that development paths are largely dependent on routines. 
Based on the economic advantages of using established methods, tech-
nologies or organisational processes they can result in little willingness 
to leave routinized pathways and open up for new innovations.
Political instruments aiming to inﬂuence the industry's development 
paths can be found on several levels and the subject of much debate. 
Political incentives which could have a signiﬁcant 'push'-effect in the 
sense of exnovation (David 2014) or that would at least partially reduce 
the use of transportation means with high emission rates are weak 
– at the national as well as international levels. Kerosene and marine 
diesel are not taxed – resulting in, de facto, an indirect subsidization 
to the detriment of less-polluting transport. Moreover, aviation and 
shipping are not subject to international regulations. This includes the 
Paris agreement, which did not produce any reduction obligations for 
these industries, despite the fact that both air and shipping trafﬁc have 
huge growth rates, thus aggravating the problem of their already high 
emissions. Since 1990 CO2 emissions from aviation have increased by 
87 per cent and from shipping by 70 per cent (European Federation for 
Transport & Environment 2011).28 Instead of including these sectors in a 
regulatory framework, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), specialized 
agencies of the United Nations, albeit strongly inﬂuenced by the indus-
try, have been entrusted with the formulation of voluntary reduction 
targets. As these targets are non-binding, the pressure to realize them 
remains low.
The same holds true for the cement industry. The fact that a single sec-
tor is liable for a 6 per cent share of global emissions (WBCSD 2012: 5) is 
reason enough to be concerned, but cement consumption has also been 
growing steadily at a rate of approximately 2.5 per cent each year and is 
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expected to increase at an even faster rate of up to 4 per cent. During the 
COP21 in Paris the cement industry committed itself to a 20-25 per cent 
reduction of CO2 emissions by 2030 compared to business as usual – a 
goal which is neither ambitious nor binding (CSI 2015; 29 FCCC/CP/2015/
L.9/Rev.1, 2015).
The Cement Industry
The national regulatory frameworks setting the rules and determining 
the scope of action for the sectors discussed are complex. First of all, a 
wide range of climate-related regulations have been passed by national 
governments and the EU in recent years. For China, the Energy De-
velopment Strategy Action Plan (2014-2020) and the National Climate 
Change Adaptation Plan (2014-2020), both issued in 2014 by the Chinese 
government (The State Council 2014a;30 2014c),31 affect development op-
portunities for the industry. The Energy Development Strategy Action 
Plan foresees a cap set on annual primary energy consumption at 4.8 
billion tonnes of the standard coal equivalent until 2020. It aims at the 
restructuring of the energy mix towards clean energy,32 especially at the 
restriction of coal consumption which is planned to be held below 4.2 
billion tonnes until 2020 (Xiang 2014).33
In recent years the Chinese authorities have increasingly strictly 
supervised compliance with national standards concerning emissions. 
Steel- and iron-processing enterprises as well as cement manufactur-
ers are shut down or severely punished if they do not meet standard 
requirements or if they use illegal production techniques (NDRC 2014: 
5;34 NDRC 2015: 4).35
Analyses show that the new policy directives are likely to reduce 
emissions in an effective way, provided that China embarks on a path 
of slower growth and creates incentives to reduce inefﬁciencies in re-
source allocation (Zhang et al 2014: 6). These goals were both articulated 
in China's Third Plenum (China Daily).36 Whether they are put into 
practice remains to be seen.
Nevertheless, there are some facts limiting the potential success of the 
regulations. On the one hand, they only affect companies operating in 
China. As Chinese enterprises are explicitly encouraged to 'go out' (Eyler 
2015b), there is a considerable risk that environmental standards are di-
luted when investments are made in other countries. This is particularly 
the case in Eastern Europe or South and Central Asia where national en-
vironmental regulations, for example concerning pollution restrictions, 
are relatively weak (McGarrity and Walker 2015;37 Rosenthal 2007; 38 Zhu 
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and Hoffman 2015). This is, for example, the case in Tajikistan where the 
cement industry is currently one of the most booming economic sectors. 
Although environmental standards exist, their enforcement remains 
poor so that Chinese cement plants, which have been engaging in the 
sector very successfully lately, face far weaker regulatory boundaries 
concerning their energy sources and environmental standards than they 
would in China (van der Kley 2016).39
On the other hand, regulations only impact on a part of CO2 emis-
sion sources. An outstanding example is cement production: Portland 
cement has become the most common type of cement for all kinds of 
infrastructure projects since its invention in the ﬁrst half of the  nineteenth 
century. Approximately 50 per cent of CO2 emitted in the manufacturing 
process originates from the chemical reaction that converts limestone 
to the primary precursor of cement: calcium oxide. Another relevant 
emission source is the fossil fuel combustion during the manufacturing 
process because cement is produced at very high temperatures. The 
remaining emissions come from transport and electricity in roughly 
equal parts (WBCSD 2012: 4). CO2 restrictions aim at the energy-related 
process while there is a lack of push factors designed to limit emissions 
generated during the chemical process. 
Although less polluting cement variations have been available for 
more than two decades, Portland cement still undisputedly dominates 
the market. While there is no exnovation-push strong enough to sup-
port the phasing out of conventional cement production, bureaucratic 
hurdles concerning standardization and certiﬁcation prolong the time 
it takes to bring the new technologies to the market (Rousseau,n.d.)40 
and make market entry even more difﬁcult. Thus institutional arrange-
ments do not only lack push factors but also hinder the diffusion of in-
novations. In fact, given the ﬁnancial and political support concerning 
growth strategies of companies in the context of the OBOR project and 
the tight timeframe to start infrastructure projects, innovation-orienta-
tion could even hamper competitiveness. In combination with ﬁnancial 
incentives provided by the project-funding institutions, institutional 
arrangements therefore act as binding forces that prevent companies 
from leaving conventional pathways.
Transport and Logistics
Financial mechanisms work similarly in the transportation sector. In 
fact, the forced development of a railway network is comparatively 
favourable for the environment as it is the transport mode for cargo 
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with the smallest ecological footprint – the extent of the ecological 
advantages obviously depend on the type of energy supply. Average 
distance CO2-emissions (per metric ton of freight and per kilometre) of 
62g for road transport and 600g for air transport on the one hand and of 
30g for rail transport on the other show a clear advantage in the latter. 
Although seafreight is − with 10g CO2 per tonne-km (NTM 2010) − the 
least CO2-emission intensive transportation mode, it has an extremely 
poor overall ecological performance. In particular, the combustion of 
residual oil and the amount of nitrogen oxide, sulphur oxide and particle 
emissions are highly problematic and contribute to a large ecological 
footprint. This in sum makes railway the environmentally most sound 
transportation mode for long distances.
Nevertheless, the new rail network is not intended to replace the 
existent transportation mix; it is designed to complement it. From an 
economic point of view, rail transport represents an intermediate seg-
ment that is located between air cargo and container ships. It is at least 
twice as fast as shipping the goods by sea but, at the same time, it is 
much more expensive (Arduino 2014). By 2014, approximately 80 per 
cent of global trade was carried by ship (South China Morning Post 
2014).41 It is to be expected that this will not change in the foreseeable 
future. Apart from the cost factor, the railway connections face technical 
problems like the use of different gauges in various countries. Several 
essential gauge changes along the route slow down the speed of freight 
transport and restrain possible time advantages that freight trains could 
offer in theory. Rail transport is much cheaper than air freight but the 
railway is nevertheless unable to compete with ﬂight connections in 
terms of speed. In addition, airlines also count on substantial increases 
in passenger transport and invest accordingly (Li 2015).42
The OBOR initiative is explicitly aimed at boosting the transport ca-
pacities of land- and sea-routes as well as strengthening international 
hub airports. Correspondingly, a considerable expansion in all segments 
is envisaged, in accordance with the original vision of a Eurasian trade 
network. This expansion is backed by the Chinese government's policy 
concerning the 'greening' of freight and logistics. The mid-to-long-term 
development plan (2014-2020) aims at a number of measures to strength-
en 'green' transportation and logistics and to raise efﬁciency gains. Nev-
ertheless, a change of the modal split is not intended (The State Council 
2014b), thus restricting the possibilities to reduce the overall emissions 
of the transport sector; the options to improve the environmental balance 
sheet of the various transportation modes are restricted.
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Pull factors aiming to facilitate the development of technical in-
novations are in place. The 'Made in China 2025' strategy (Zhang 
2015),43  which has been unveiled by China's State Council, promotes 
the development of high-end technology in all transportation modes. 
This includes sustainability innovations. But – at the same time − the 
strategy is strongly linked to economic growth targets. Thus, all four 
motorized transportation modes are among the ten key sectors that are 
to be supported as part of this plan. Intensiﬁed promotion of low-carbon 
transport modes in order to achieve a more sustainable model split is 
not part of the plan.
Push factors with regard to the transportation sector are also scarce. 
As kerosene and marine diesel are not taxed, there are few ﬁnancial 
incentives for transportation and logistics enterprises to change their 
transportation modes, particularly as there is no pressure coming from 
reduction targets.
Quantitative Optimization as Sustainability Strategy
Attempts to improve the environmental performance of both the indus-
tries discussed above tend to concentrate on efﬁciency optimization. 
This is largely reﬂected in the sustainability strategies formulated by 
multinational enterprises and trade associations themselves.
As a rule, all multinationals publish their own sustainability strategies. 
However, although radical technical innovations have been made and 
can be found in these strategies − like the aforementioned invention of 
several types of ecological-friendly cement as alternatives to Portland 
cement (Rousseau n.d.) − innovations are not central to most strategies. 
Instead, quantitative innovations, like improving efﬁciency in produc-
tion and administrative processes to reduce impacts, remain at the core 
of most sustainability strategies – thus restricting the opportunities for 
structural change. International frameworks, mostly designed as self-
regulatory initiatives, have been established by industry associations such 
as the International Coalition for Sustainable Aviation (ICSA), the Clean 
Shipping Coalition (CSC) or the Cement Sustainability Initiative (CSI). 
In addition, non-sector-speciﬁc international organizations, like the 
OECD guidelines for Multinational enterprises (OECD 2008), the United 
Nation's Global Compact (Global Compact 2015),44 the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI 2015)45 or the World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development (WBCSD 2012) provide guidelines and monitoring tools 
in order to assist companies to achieve more sustainable performance 
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results. By formulating general principles and providing monitoring 
systems industry initiatives improve sustainable performance, but they 
are not suited to the initiation of fundamental transition processes.
The Inﬂuence of Multilateral Financing Institutions: The 
Example of AIIB
Important additional performance regulations come from the ﬁnancing 
institutions. All ﬁnancing institutions involved in the OBOR initiative 
provide regulatory frameworks that address environmental goals; the 
most comprehensive has been formulated by the AIIB (Asian Infra-
structure Investment Bank). Its Environmental and Social Framework 
(AIIB 2016a: 14) requires, inter alia, private and public clients to un-
dertake environmental and social assessments, including evaluations 
of environmental data and risks as well as prescribing monitoring and 
reporting measures for ongoing projects to ensure compliance with the 
framework. These regulations are complemented by an exclusion list, 
which expressly precludes the ﬁnancing of socially or environmentally 
harmful projects (AIIB 2016a: 46-47). On the whole, the formulation of 
the guidelines nonetheless leaves considerable room for manoeuvre. 
They allow for mitigating, offsetting and compensating for adverse 
impacts, and so on. Being ﬁrmly committed to the principles of green 
growth, the regulations aim to deal as effectively as possible with 
negative effects, without losing the primary focus on economic growth. 
While supporting environmentally sounder behaviour among clients, 
and thereby providing comparatively soft regulatory push, the guide-
lines cannot be expected to encourage the waiving of unsustainable 
practices on this basis.
Particularly in connection with multinational transport and construc-
tion infrastructure providers, the envisaged AIIB Energy Strategy could 
theoretically be an important instrument as the energy mix promoted 
in this context could have a substantial and direct impact on the CO2-
intensity of the project units. But here again, the effectiveness of the 
guidelines depends on the actual strength of the focus on sustainable 
energy sources. The preliminary issues note (AIIB 2016b) provides for 
the support of renewable energy, but does not exclude active support of 
technically advanced fossil fuel based energy production. Push impacts 
to adopt major sustainability-relevant innovations are restricted within 
the broad limits of the issues note, thus limiting the immense potential 
of the regulating strategy.
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Conclusion
In sum, economic pressure for European and Chinese multinationals 
to leave the current path due to slower economic growth in China and 
a weak economy in the eurozone is apparent as a potential push factor. 
Investing in 'green economy' strategies as an alternative to business 
as usual holds forth the promise of economic success. This does not, 
however, really translate into a need to profoundly change routines or 
to embark on innovative paths for the industry sectors addressed in this 
article. One reason is that current stimulus programmes, especially the 
OBOR initiative, maintain the prospect that a fundamental shift will 
not be necessary. 
Moreover, against the background of enormous demand, particularly 
as many Asian and European regions are under pressure to catch up 
economically, the lack of orientation towards sustainable development 
objectives is unlikely to negatively inﬂuence the economic success of 
the companies involved. The main incentives generated by the OBOR 
initiative focus on economic growth. Although there are also some en-
vironmental goals, they are generally assumed to be compatible with 
economic growth targets. Without exception, for the industry sectors 
considered here this results in environmental goals ranking second to 
efforts to stabilize and promote economic parameters.
Ecological improvements that are triggered by national provisions 
or self-regulatory initiatives certainly improve environmental perform-
ance but they do not bring about structural change. Past experience has 
clearly shown that quantitative innovations incur a high risk of rebound 
effects – which are in this case very likely to arise, given the scope of 
the envisaged project. Multilateral ﬁnancing institutions generally have 
great potential to stimulate behaviour changes. But as the example of 
AIIB shows, these potentials rarely reach fruition; environmental frame-
works aiming at innovation push are provided, but they leave much 
scope for companies to remain on unsustainable paths.
Ultimately, both push and pull factors within the framework of gov-
ernance arrangements remain weak, as in the preceding discussions of 
the transport and cement industries. A change of the modal split or a shift 
towards more environmentally sound building materials are therefore 
not to be expected on the basis of currently available governance instru-
ments. Instead, institutional regulation and incentive systems support 
minor 'green' changes but have – on the whole − a rather reinforcing 
effect on the orientation towards conventional development paths for 
the multinational enterprises involved in the OBOR project.
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